Introduction
This Chapter explores bases for assigning positive duties of international assistance and cooperation to fulfil socio-economic rights in the world.
1 A difficulty at present is that states can only be said to have imprecise obligations to fulfil socio-economic rights beyond their borders: they are largely aggregated duties of an undifferentiated international community (to use Philip Alston's term), to cooperate in addressing hunger, malnutrition and related deprivations that find expression in human rights treaties.
There are two main benefits that could come from determining the bases for assigning obligations in this area. First, clarity as to the scope of obligations of international assistance and cooperation could compel states to act in order to give them effect. Second, it would facilitate the determination of a breach of an international obligation of a state or states and thus responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. International responsibility could be attributed as a result of an action or omission -things states have and have not done to contribute to securing socio-economic rights elsewhere. Insofar as all states are bound by obligations of international cooperation under the United Nations (UN) Charter, 2 and states party to the relevant treaties addressing economic, social and cultural rights are bound by obligations of international assistance and/or cooperation, 3 a central task that remains is to identify the basis or bases upon which duties might be disaggregated and thus more clearly assigned.
When it comes to positive duties to fulfil socio-economic rights, causation may provide a basis for assigning obligations of international assistance and cooperation, however it hardly exhausts the possible grounds in this regard. States acting singly or jointly need not have caused harm in order to be under a positive duty to address the non-fulfilment of socioeconomic rights elsewhere, nor in order to be held responsible for an internationally wrongful act derived from a failure to comply with a human rights obligation to assist and cooperate internationally.
Although it may be difficult to conclude that there exists a legally binding obligation for a given state to provide any particular form of material assistance to any other specific state(s), decades of UN consideration and standard setting in this and related areas have advanced interpretations of the obligation, whereby economic, financial, monetary and other policies should be designed in such a way as to avoid causing injury to the interests of other states and to the rights of their peoples, 4 and moreover, should actively seek to address existing 3 The sources of the obligation to cooperate internationally in the realisation of socio-economic rights can be traced back to the UN Charter's emphasis on international cooperation in the achievement of social justice and human rights which forms a defining element of that foundational treaty (Articles 1(3), 55 and 56) . The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Paris, 10 December 1948, UN Doc. A/RES/217A(III), UNGAOR, 3 rd Sess., UN Doc. A/810 (1948), recognises the significance of international cooperation in the realisation of human rights (Articles 22 and 28); and obligations of international assistance and cooperation in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) and similar formulations in the CRC, n. 1, form part of the general legal obligations in those widely ratified treaties: ICESCR, ibid., Article 2(1) provides that '[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.' The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, n. 1, at Article 4(2) asserts the following: '[a]s a complement to the efforts of developing countries, effective international cooperation is essential in providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their comprehensive development. ' The obligations of which we speak were not borne of globalisation; the treaties that underpinned the new world order in 1945 underscored 70 years ago that cooperation was essential to the establishment of a peaceful and just world. That said, the harms of globalisation and its attendant institutions reinforce the current significance of obligations of international assistance and cooperation to the ends of socio-economic justice. The forces of globalisation compel the cosmopolitan ethic that animates these obligations today.
Bases for assigning obligations of international assistance and cooperation

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee
In a state-centric system that remains largely circumscribed territorially, international human rights law generally recognises that the primary obligation to fulfil socio-economic 14 The significance of distinguishing between whether the domestic state is unable or unwilling to comply with its obligations is important in determining its own responsibility for failure to meet its human rights obligations, inability giving rise to possible defences that might preclude wrongfulness. However the distinction bears no relevance as regards the assignment of secondary duties to external states, which is determined on the should best understand these obligations amongst external states to remedy the state of affairs as complementary to those of the right-holder's own state. 15 To ignore the existence of an obligation to take remedial international action would be to hollow out the value of the positive obligation of international cooperation for the realisation of socio-economic rights. It is difficult, however, to determine when an obligation of international assistance and/or cooperation has been breached, thereby giving rise to a claim of international legal responsibility, because there is a paucity of judicial elucidation as to what directives would indicate that a given state was required to act in a particular situation, and how, in order to contribute to fulfilling socio-economic rights in the world. Only one general basis for assigning obligations has so far been adopted by the Committee:
that international cooperation for development and thus for the realisation of economic, those States in a position to assist', a point to which we will return. 19 A second and merely hortatory reference indicates that the inability of people in developing countries to exercise their socio-economic rights is 'of common concern to all countries', 20 the Committee's pronouncement on the existence of a 'common concern' implying an erga omnes or indeed an omnium erga omnes obligation.
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Causation as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation
The allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act requires the existence of a causal link that also meets the criterion of, for example, directness, foreseeability or proximity. When it comes to the obligations of states other than the right-holder's own to respect and protect socio-economic rights, in addition to direct causation, international legal responsibility could be attributed on the grounds that the actions or omissions (whether international or internal decisions with external effect) had reasonably foreseeable international consequences 24 and/or because of the lack of due diligence undertaken to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required. 25 In 26 Salomon, 'Deprivation, Causation and the Law of International Cooperation', n. *, at 263-72. 27 The price suppression claim by the Panel -upheld by the Appellate Body -was determined via the application of a 'but for' test. In upholding Brazil's claim, the Panel examined whether the world market price for cotton would have increased significantly 'but for these subsidies'. Indirect causation might also be relevant insofar as the very design of existing global arrangements causes and/or fails to remedy widespread deprivation. On this account, the failure is that of the international political economy as a whole, and all states -to greater or lesser degrees -are thereby responsible for 'causing' the harms and are duty-bound to remedy them. 29 (That said, this structural thesis leads us back to having to disaggregate duties.)
Historical responsibility as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation
On this account contemporary obligations would be assigned on the basis of historical responsibility for past exploitation. Although not a precondition, the harmful effects of past actions may be traceable to current deprivations in the form of the non-fulfilment of socio- 
Capacity as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation
As noted above, the CESCR has emphasised that particular obligations of international assistance and cooperation are incumbent on those states in 'a position to assist', and as such indicates capacity as a basis for assigning obligations. Capacity offers both a specific and a general requirement: specific in that it is one of the bases that points to the requisite international duty-bearers, and general in that it is a prerequisite to discharging any obligation.
Thus, one could argue for example that historical responsibility should form a basis for assigning international obligations, but capacity would still be a necessary element in order to see that obligation fulfilled. standards set on the basis of the range of factors, including special needs and circumstances, future economic development of countries, and historical contributions to the creation of an environmental problem. 38 In international environmental law, the principle of CBDR does not in itself offer a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation, nor for dividing duties amongst those states with the greater responsibilities. These are fleshed out in the provisions of a given instrument that differentiates specific duties by category of states. 39 It is a principle that recognises that states should -for the range of reasons provided earlier -possess different duties, and underpins steps that allow for differential treatment to those ends. Its practical application can take the form of, for example, increased time to implement treaty commitments, exemptions, burden sharing through the allocation of funding, and the transfer of technology. CBDR might be said to offer a general principle of equity, with differential treatment concerned with the realisation of substantive equality over time aimed at enhancing the social and economic development of those worst-off in the world. As such, it seeks to provide remedial measures aimed at achieving what the drafters agree would be a more just society. 40 In sum, although the principle of CBDR may represent merely 'the nucleus of an emerging framework of global burden sharing', 41 it can be seen as part of a broader normative development in international law that requires action on the part of those 'in a position to assist'. It also points to an emerging procedural requirement for states to coordinate with each other in the allocation of particular duties necessary to discharge their respective obligations to cooperate effectively. 42 
Capacity and the matter of cost
When relying on those states with the capacity to assist in fulfilling obligations, the division of duties is determined also according to states that could most easily avert or redress the threat or violation to basic well-being in a given situation. The converse is that
should it be too difficult for a state to avert or redress the human rights threat or violation, then there is no obligation to do so. 43 A consideration of capacity as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation thus begs the subsequent question as to where the line is to be drawn.
In meeting its positive obligations of international assistance and cooperation to fulfil socioeconomic rights beyond territory, the question arises as to what would constitute an unreasonable cost on the part of a state acting internationally. It might be assumed that a state having broadly secured a high level of socio-economic rights for its people is in a position to take steps to fulfil socio-economic rights abroad, perhaps requiring an expenditure of financial or other resources. This approach takes as its starting point that states can act in fulfilling rights elsewhere because socio-economic rights have been realised at home. Ooms and Hammonds recognise the risk that this approach invites when it comes to rights that are progressively realised and indeterminate. They argue with regard to the right to health for example, that in order to avoid a situation whereby high-income countries could endlessly refute their obligations of international assistance by referring to their domestic obligations to achieve the 'moving target of the highest attainable standard of health', any country that has realised the minimum essential level of health domestically is duty-bound to contribute to that same standard elsewhere before aiming for the (progressively realisable) highest attainable standard of health. It is immaterial to the finding of a breach of an obligation of conduct for a single state whose responsibility is in issue to claim that it could make little difference on its own in the prevention of a violation, even had it used all means reasonably at its disposal, as the ICJ has noted in a different context: 'the more so since the possibility remains that the combined efforts of several states, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved the result [of averting the harm] (…) which the efforts of only one state were insufficient to produce'. 51 In addition, although it is not certain that a given intervention would have prevented the harm, that actuality is irrelevant to establishing responsibility. 52 In circumstances where more than one state is responsible, each state is separately responsible for conduct attributable to it and that responsibility is not diminished by the fact that it is not the only responsible state. This is equally the case in a situation where a single course of conduct is at the same time attributable to several states and is internationally wrongful for each of them.
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The preliminary conclusions on this matter are twofold: on the one hand, we can recognise the existence of collective legal obligations while relying, so far, on an individualised regime of legal responsibility in the event of a breach of those obligations. On the other hand, the truly collective action required to fulfil this obligation might best invite the application of a standard of joint and several responsibility whereby the victim could claim for the full amount against any wrongdoing state, even if no one state is likely to be able adequately to compensate for the collective failure when it comes to reparations, and other methods will need to be devised. The responsible state will also have the option, in principle, of claiming against the other wrongdoing states for their contribution to the harm. 54 As
Nollkaemper and Jacobs rightly point out, when obligations require collective action, it is reasonable for shared responsibility to be implied in the event of a breach. 55 The standard of joint and several responsibility is instructive, as Judge Simma explains in his separate Opinion in the Oil Platforms case: 'on the one hand it recognizes the difficulty of a finding of responsibility where apportionment is impossible. On the other hand, it excludes as unfair a solution in which no one would be held responsible'. 56 The second issue warranting note is that poverty and the widespread violation of socioeconomic rights are avoidable through the creation of fairer international institutions, 57 the imperative being to elaborate, interpret and apply international rules in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards of decency, in many instances as articulated through human rights. 58 International cooperation is not limited to the distribution of resources and goods, but also includes the establishment of just institutional procedural principles 59 and a system of rules that distributes the consequential effects of the law fairly. towards the socio-economic rights of its people. 65 Further, a developing country could submit a communication claiming that other s tate parties (or another s tate party) are not taking the necessary steps, separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to create an international enabling environment conducive to the universal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights by failing to elaborate or review multilateral and bilateral agreements, so as to render them consistent with international human rights standards. 66 As for concerns pertaining to grave or systematic violations under the inquiry procedure, where the Committee is granted competence it should have no shortage of issues to examine in a world where the realisation of human rights is being brought to its knees by food, financial and environmental crises.
Concluding remarks
As a matter of positive international human rights law obligations of international assistance and cooperation are not discretionary. But unless we begin to see delineated what is required, when, and by which state(s), they may as well be voluntary. While this Chapter has only scratched the surface as to how we might think about establishing international responsibility in a world of great deprivations where duties to confront need extend beyond the right-holders own state, it is clear that our doctrines and mechanisms are hardly fit for purpose. A thoughtful commentator remarked recently that the biggest blind spot in global human rights is the political economy, 67 it is high time this changed or justice will continue to evade us.
